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Umeå Working Papers in Peace and Conflict Studies, no 13

ISSN 1654-2398

ISBN 978-91-7855-203-0

Publication date 2020-01-16. Copyright © Authors

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Different Methods for Analyzing Varieties of Peace

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Abstract

Peace can take many different forms and be expressed in a myriad of different ways that go well-beyond “peace as the absence of war”. Though recent scholarly contributions within this vein of research acknowledge the empirical reality of a variety of “peaces”, we are yet to understand how – methodologically – researchers can go about the endeavor of developing tools that allow us to describe and classify *varieties of peace*. Our effort in this paper addresses this knowledge gap. We bring attention to different methods for empirically capturing varieties of peace when peace is approached as a situation, as a relationship or as an idea. Though our purpose is to illustrate a “smorgasbord of methods” for analyzing varieties of peace, we also argue that any effort to approach such an analysis ought to be based on theoretically coherent sets of types. This is so because it will allow the researcher to provide a more nuanced picture of different varieties of peace.

Keywords: varieties of peace, methods, theoretically coherent sets of types

Introduction

As noted by Jarstad et al. (2019) and many other recent scholarly contributions, what peace beyond the mere absence of war means, is an understudied field of inquiry (see e.g. Davenport et al. 2018; Höglund and Söderberg Kovacs 2010; Diehl 2016). In this paper, our point of departure is that peace can take many different forms and many different expressions, in essence; that there are varieties of peace.

Our effort in this paper is part of ongoing research conducted within the Varieties of Peace research program at the Department of Political Science, Umeå University. The overarching purpose of this research program is to shed light on, analyze, and understand the different types of peace that evolved in the aftermath of the peace processes of the 1990s, and to describe and understand how this variation can be explained. In this paper we explore *how*, methodologically, varieties of peace, or perhaps rather “peaces” can be described and analyzed. In a nutshell; when attempting to describe varieties of peace, how does one proceed?

It shall be established at the very outset of this paper that we concur with Jarstad et al. (2019) in their assertion that, on an analytical level, it is useful to approach peace in three distinctly different ways. Namely: i) peace as a situation, ii) peace as a relationship, and iii) peace as an idea. Though we will on forthcoming pages discuss, in brief, what peace as a

situation entails; peace as a relationship entails; peace as an idea entails, it shall nevertheless be emphasized that this paper is primarily a methodological enterprise.¹

The purpose of this paper is to propose different methods for describing and analyzing *varieties of peace*, and to do so by conceptually approaching peace as a situation, as a relationship and as an idea. In a sense; to describe varieties of peace within each of these approaches. The main point is to present and discuss different methodological choices that are at the disposal of the researcher when she/he sets out to capture the empirical reality which arguably consist of exactly that: varieties of peace. One could simply say that we attempt to illustrate a “smorgasbord of methods” for the purpose of developing analytical tools that help us describe and analyze varieties of peace, and to also discuss the analytical merits and drawbacks of these different choices.

This paper is organized as such: in the next section we discuss previous scholarly work that has attempted to nuance, as well as bring more analytical sharpness, to the concept of peace, beyond peace as the absence of war, i.e. negative peace as most commonly associated with Galtung (1969). We will discuss this literature in general terms as well as highlight specific contributions that better help to situate our efforts as we present them in this paper. We then bring attention to how we envision that our effort brings something novel to this specific field of research. Thereafter, we explain our conceptual approach in terms of peace as a situation, peace as a relationship, and peace as an idea. This section is followed by the smorgasbord of methods as referred to above. In this part of the paper we suggest, and discuss, four different methods for developing tools for the analysis of varieties of peace when peace is understood as a situation, as a relationship and as an idea. The paper concludes by discussing potential advantages and drawbacks of each of these different approaches for describing varieties of peace, and in so doing also illustrate the contribution of our effort – our proposed method – to the field of research.

Situating the present study

Much research that has set out to disentangle and nuance the concept of peace has been focused on developing ideal types. The method for doing so has, to a considerable extent, been a mixture of a deductive and an inductive approach where the researcher/researchers have moved between theoretical constructs and ideas concerning the constitutive elements of different types of peace, and the empirical realities of post-conflict states; what elements of peace beyond the absence of war can be detected in such empirical cases? By combining an inductive/deductive approach, ideal types have then been developed. This method of going about the endeavor has left the field of study with a considerable number of “peace with adjectives”, quite similar to the field of research concerned with nuancing the concept of “democracy” beyond the core elements of this particular concept (see e.g. Collier and Levitsky, 1997).

Many examples of peace with adjectives are found in the literature that explores conceptualizations of the peace concept. To name only but a few, we may find: “armed peace” (Booth, 1975), “negative peace” (Galtung, 1969), “guided peace” (Zartman, 1995), “cruel peace” (Zartman, 1995), “elusive peace” (Zartman, 1995), “conditional peace” (George, 2000),

¹ Please refer to Jarstad et al. 2019 for a comprehensive discussion about the three approaches to peace.

“precarious peace” (George, 2000), “cold peace” (Miller, 2001) “rentier peace” (Basedau and Ley, 2009) and “territorial peace” (Gibler 2012). Though these scholarly contributions are valuable as they direct attention to the need to approach the concept of peace in a more analytical sharp and distinct way than what has hitherto been the case, they are nevertheless stand-alone concepts that do not relate to each other. Hence, empirical cases are not being evaluated as x, y or the z-type of peace based on the same set of criteria. Therefore we can only know that “conditional peace” is different from “cruel peace”, but we are not given the analytical tools to be able to tell how these two types relate to each other.

Though ideal types is one method for developing tools for analyzing varieties of peace, and one that we shall devote more attention to and elaborate in the section of this paper that deals with the different methods we have set out to focus on, the very fact that these ideal types are stand-alone concepts that do not relate to one another is a drawback. Other issues, which also relate to these ideal types being stand-alone concepts, are that researchers tend to conflate different types of peace with each other. “Democratic peace”, “constitutional peace” and “institutional peace” are, for example, often conflated with each other and used interchangeably, indicating that these three types are to be understood as one and the same type of peace (see e.g. Pospienza and Schneider 2013, Richmond, 2006). Another issue is that, when these ideal types are stand-alone concepts, the same label (or “adjective” if one prefers), or one single label, may be utilized for different types of peace. For example, Richmond (2006) refers to “liberal peace” in which “institutional peace” and “constitutional peace” are constitutive parts. Lastly, as this method does not generate ideal types that relate to each other, it is also likely that researchers would refer to different types of peace, but use the same label when doing so. Hence, one scholar may refer to “illiberal peace” and do so based on a partially different understanding of what this type of peace specifically constitutes compared to another scholar who might likewise use the term “illiberal peace”.

Research that sets out to conceptualize peace, understand how it can be studied and, as we do in this paper, illustrate different methods for differentiating the concept will find that it needs to position/relate its point of departure and arguments in relation to Davenport, Melander and Regan’s (2018) recent study. Indeed, *The Peace Continuum* by Davenport et al. (2018) represents the current “state of the art” in this specific vein of research. Davenport and colleagues share our point of departure as far as conceptualizing the concept of peace is concerned on two main points; the first being that peace holds greater variance than peace or no peace, i.e. that peace is not a dichotomous concept, but rather a concept that contains variance. The second being that the concept of peace can be measured on a scale, i.e. it ought to be possible (with a suitable set of indicators of course) to determine if an empirical case is *more* or *less* peaceful (compared to other states and compared to its own development over time). Peace may hence be understood as a continuum, or as a scale if one prefers, on which states can move up and down. Now, how this peace continuum ought to be constructed and which, and how many, indicators that ought to underlie the continuum is a matter for discussion; a discussion which the authors engage with in the book, and a discussion that results in them putting forth their own individual propositions (Davenport et al. 2018). This is not the place to reiterate the arguments of Davenport et al. (2018) in full. We will, however, revisit Davenport and the work of his colleagues later in this paper when we set out to illustrate how their work more specifically relates to ours.

Another manner through which peace can be understood and measured is to acknowledge that peace is a multifaceted concept that contains numerous aspects; aspects that when taken together, and weighed against each other, make it possible to determine the level of “peacefulness” that a specific state experiences during a specific year. The perhaps most prominent example of such an approach is the Global Peace Index (GPI). By the use of quantitative and qualitative indicators, the GPI measures the state of peace in 163 states around the globe (in its 2018 edition), and does so by studying three specific domains: i) the level of societal safety and security, ii) the extent of ongoing domestic and international conflict, and iii) the degree of militarization. In the first of these dimensions, aspects such as the extent to which countries are involved in internal and external conflicts is explored in addition to the role that they play in the specific conflict/conflicts, as well as the extent of time that they are involved in said conflict/conflicts. In the second dimension, the index is concerned with issues that set out to reveal the extent of harmony versus discord in a given society. In order to capture this, countries are assessed along ten indicators ranging from crime rates to terrorist activity, to relations with neighboring countries, to the proportion of the population being internally displaced, to a stable political scene and a number of other indicators. For the third and last dimension, the GPI sets out to understand the extent to which a given country is militarized, and does so by evaluating states on seven different indicators; examples include military expenditure as a percentage of GDP and financial contributions to UN peacekeeping operations, to name a couple. As mentioned above, all of the indicators measured across the three different dimensions are subsequently weighed against each other, in turn producing a single value for each individual state in the index, making it possible to determine how peaceful a state is in relation to other states, and in relation to its own state of peacefulness compared to previous years (The Global Peace Index, 2018). Important to note however, is that the GPI gives an estimate of the state of peacefulness that ranges from high to low; i.e. “peacefulness” is the only variant of peace that is being measured, countries are not estimated/measured/evaluated as *different* types of peace.

Another study that also deserves mentioning in this context is Högberg and Söderberg Kovacs research from 2010. In their article ‘Beyond the absence of war: the diversity of peace in post-settlement societies’, the authors set out to conceptualize variations of peace in post-war societies. Högberg and Söderberg Kovacs go about this endeavor by utilizing Galtung’s famous conflict triangle as their theoretical point of departure, but with the important difference of turning the focal point of Galtung’s triangle (conflict) to its diametrical opposite, i.e. peace, and referring to their theoretical construct as the “peace triangle” (Högberg and Söderberg Kovacs, 2010, 376). Though the three corners of the peace triangle each represent the same dimensions that Galtung (1969) proposed in his conflict triangle, i.e. attitudes, issues, and behaviors, the thrust of Högberg and Söderberg Kovacs argument is that post-settlement societies will give rise to different types of peace, depending on what types of weaknesses or vulnerabilities remain. More specifically they argue that these weaknesses can be related to whether and how core *issues* at the heart of the conflict have been addressed; to whether and how *behaviors* of warring parties have altered and; to whether and how the *attitudes* of warring parties have changed. For example, depending on how the core issues that lied at the heart of the conflict have been (or not been) addressed at the end of the war, post-war peace can develop into what Högberg and Söderberg Kovacs (2010, 376) refer to as an “unresolved peace”, a

“contested peace”, or a “restored peace”. Likewise, post-settlement societies can vary insofar that the conflicting parties agree, or do not agree, to change their violent behaviors, lay down their arms, etc., in order for peaceful behaviors to commence. The extent to which conflicting parties are successful in changing their behaviors may render the post-conflict state different types of peace as well, more specifically; a “partial peace”, a “regional peace” or an “insecure peace” (Höglund and Söderberg Kovacs, 2010, 379). And lastly, the extent to which warring parties have, or have not, altered their attitudes can, according to the authors, produce different types of peace as well, specifically; a “polarized peace”, an “unjust peace” or a “fearful peace” (Höglund and Söderberg Kovacs, 2010, 382).

We argue that the authors make an important, and novel contribution to this field of study by turning the conflict triangle into a peace triangle and by conceptualizing peace as something that extends beyond the mere absence of war. We, however, conclude that the peace triangle with its characteristic corners – issues, behaviors, and attitudes – yields ideal types, much like previous research in this vein, and that the different kinds of peace within each of these corners constitute illustrative examples rather than coherent sets of types. Let us exemplify; “restored peace”, “contested peace” and “unresolved peace” are three separate *kinds* of peace when one analyses post-war peace on the basis of whether (or not) the core issues that lied at the heart of the conflict have been resolved. These three are, hence, distinctly different kinds of peace, they *do not* represent different *degrees* of post-war peace when post-war peace is approached in terms unresolved issues. Thus, Höglund and Söderberg Kovacs (2010) do not take the second step toward theoretically coherent sets of types that we call for and that we argue will bring more nuance to the analysis of varieties of peace (nor do they claim to take that step).

In the next section we elaborate what theoretically coherent sets of types implies, and hence, the logic that underpins our methodological take on developing analytical tools that can help us capture varieties of peace.

What we are bringing to the table

In light of the scholarly contributions that have been made to this vein of research, it is relevant to specify what we are bringing to the table in terms of scientific novelty. We make two propositions in this paper. First, while scholars have already proposed a number of different types of peace, the majority of these types are stand-alone concepts – as just described above. We believe that a *theoretically coherent set of types* would be more analytically useful. Theoretically coherent set of types is something that is substantially more developed in research on conflict – compared to research on peace – which can be used to illustrate our point. For example; we might observe that some conflicts are about territory; we may call them territorial conflicts. We might also observe that some conflicts are fought between a government and a domestic rebel group; we may call them intrastate conflicts. As stand-alone concepts territorial conflicts and intrastate conflicts are somewhat useful, as we can for example distinguish between territorial conflicts and conflicts about other issues, and study territorial conflicts as a particular kind of conflict that might share specific causes, dynamics or forms of resolution.

This line of inquiry can however also be taken to the next step, as the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) has done, and conclude that both territorial conflicts and intra-state

conflicts belong to (different) coherent sets of types of conflict. The first set of types is *based on the actors involved* and consists of four types: extrastate, interstate, intrastate, and internationalized conflicts. The second set is *based on the incompatibility* and consists of two types: conflicts over government and conflicts over territory. And there is a third set as well, which is *based on conflict intensity* and consists of two types: minor armed conflicts and major armed conflicts (or wars). Clearly, the different types of conflict used in the UCDP are more useful as parts of these different sets of types than they would be as stand-alone concepts.

However, with very few exceptions, research on the concept of peace has not been taken to this second step of theoretical organization, and instead remains at the level of stand-alone concepts.

Our second proposition is that the conceptualizations of different types of peace depend on how we aim to use them - or rather, they *should* depend on how we aim to use them. Babbie (2016, 128) argues that “concepts have no real, true, or objective meanings - only those we agree are best for a particular purpose.” He goes on (2016, 152) to state that “the only justification for giving any concept a particular meaning is utility”. Or as expressed by Goertz (2006, 28): “One cannot neatly separate the ontology of a concept from the role it plays in causal theories and explanations”. What this means for conceptualizations of peace is that if our aim is to be able to separate cases of peace (whether in terms of situations, relations or ideas) from cases of non-peace, what we need is a definition of peace that contains clear criteria which empirical cases can be evaluated against. In principle, this is the case for most stand-alone concepts of peace, such as “armed peace”, “cruel peace”, or “rentier peace” that enable us to distinguish between cases of X type of peace and non-cases of X type of peace.

Alternatively, we may aspire to order different situations or relations (or ideas) from less to more peaceful, either in general or as weaker and stronger examples of a certain type of peace (cf. the Global Peace Index above). If different types of peace represent differences in kind (corresponding to a nominal level of measurement), the ability to order peace refers to differences in degree (requiring a conceptualization of peace at an ordinal level of measurement - or even interval or ratio).

When we call for a theoretically coherent set of types of peace (or indeed more than one such coherent set of types), we mean that peace research should aim for a conceptualization of peace that allows us to *both* divide empirical cases into different types of peace (types that are not stand-alone concepts) *and* to rank them in relation to the particular type they belong to. Getting there will require both theoretical and methodological work, and, again, the focus of the present paper is on the methodological aspects of this effort. Towards the end of this paper, under heading *Four methods for analyzing varieties of peace*, we describe how these two propositions materialize in a concrete methodological suggestion for developing analytical tools for exactly that; varieties of peace. Before we turn to this endeavor however, the following section briefly discusses conceptualizations and operationalizations of peace.

Conceptualizing and operationalizing peace

As noted in the introduction, in order to advance our thinking and to help us develop better tools for analyzing varieties of peace, we argue that peace, conceptually, can be approached in

three different ways: i) peace as a situation, ii) peace as a relationship, and iii) peace as an idea. Of course, peace may be conceptualized in other ways as well, but for the purposes of this paper and for the overarching research objectives of the Varieties of Peace program, we argue that this three tiered approach is helpful (see also Jarstad et al. 2019). In the following, we will explain what each of these three conceptualizations imply, and also suggest how these conceptualizations can subsequently be operationalized to allow for their measurement.

To argue that peace can be understood as a situation is probably not too controversial. Peace as a situation is, arguably, the first thing that springs to mind when one reflects on the concept as such. When referring to peace as a situation we are hence approaching the concept as a state, i.e. a situation that is more or less at peace. Important to note, which has bearing on how one operationalizes the concept, is that peace as a situation can vary quite a bit, not least *within* a given country. There may be “pockets of peace” in specific regions of a country that is experiencing civil war, for example. Campbell et al. (2017, 93) describe such a situation in the context of the war in Darfur; a severely violent conflict that resulted in an estimated death toll of 300, 000 people during the years 2003-2006. Yet, despite the severity of the violence, most of the eastern and central parts of Darfur remained peaceful during this time period. As Campbell et al. point out, cooperative activity as well as violent activity can be ongoing in regions, cities and villages, and even co-exist in the same regions, cities and villages, at the same time, which makes the “peacefulness” of these locations vary even though they might be geographically close to each other (Campbell et al. 2017, 97). To conclude; peace as a situation can relate to different geographical areas at different levels, including the international level, the national level, the regional level, and the community level. But of course, peace as a situation, can also refer to the whole of the country if, in fact, the whole of the country is at peace.

In order to determine how peaceful a state is, or how peaceful certain regions of a state are, we have in previous work (Jarstad et al. 2019, 6) argued that there are two specific dimensions – *security* and *political order* – that are useful indicators. We will, very briefly, touch upon these two below.²

The presence of at least some type of basic security could arguably be related to notions of negative peace – i.e., the absence of war. As has already been discussed, however, we argue that conceptualizations of peace need to move further and allow for nuances that capture empirical varieties of peace that exist between negative and positive peace. As such, our understanding of security is not merely the absence of physical violence and fear of such violence, to also include freedom of movement and an element of predictability. Predictability in the sense that individuals can rely on the situation remaining secure for the foreseeable future (Jarstad et al. 2019, 6).

The type of political order is the second dimension that is a useful indicator to determine the extent of peace when peace is approached as a situation. When referring to political order we are specifically concerned with formal institutions, informal mechanisms as well as norms for managing conflicts in a peaceful manner (Jarstad et al. 2019, 7). We are also, as we have argued elsewhere (Jarstad et al. 2019) interested in knowing the extent of space for civil

² For a comprehensive discussion, please refer to Jarstad et al. 2019.

engagement, for protests, activism and debate; these too are aspects that indicate the extent of political freedom and by extent the state of affairs for the political order as such.

Hence, in order to analyze peace as a situation, appropriate empirical indicators that correspond to the aspects of the two dimensions – security and political order – need to be consulted (Jarstad et al. 2019). As expressed by Jarstad et al.: “By analyzing peace as a situation based on these two dimensions, it will be possible to see that different cases exhibit different levels and forms of security as well as different types of political orders, in turn making it possible to distinguish these differences as *varieties of peace as situation*.”

On a conceptual level, peace can also be approached as a relationship between actors or groups. Here we lean on the conceptual analysis developed by Söderström et al. (2019). In brief; this is an actor centered approach to peace in which the unit of analysis consists of dyads; for example, pairs of leaders or organizations, or even municipalities (Jarstad et al. 2019, 10). To understand the extent and type of peace that exists between actors in a relationship, we are hence advised to study their peace characteristics. This is facilitated by the analytical framework developed by Söderström et al. (2019). In essence; varieties of peaceful relationships can be detected if one analyses the relationship in a given dyad on the basis of three different components. These are: *behavioral interactions* which includes the following three expressions; non-domination, deliberation, cooperation. Hence, peaceful behavioral interactions implies non-domination, deliberation and cooperation (Söderström et al. 2019, 15). *Subjective attitudes towards the other*, in turn, includes the following expressions; mutual recognition and mutual trust. By extent, this means that peaceful subjective attitudes (towards the other) are characterized by mutual recognition and mutual trust. *Idea of relationship*, lastly, can take either of the following expressions: legitimate co-existence or friendship. To be sure, how to best operationalize peace as a relationship depends on the specific units of analysis one is interested in exploring (actors, organizations, or some other relationship). As exemplified in Jarstad et al. (2019, 12): “deliberation can be observed in parliamentary and public debates and cooperation can be observed with regards to political alliances and peace agreements between former foes, mixed marriages across former conflict lines”.

Third and last, peace may also be approached as an idea. As we have argued in Jarstad et al. (2019, 13-16), this involves both the ideas, experiences and visions of peace amongst individuals at the grassroots level as well as among state actors, such as for example politicians, the military, police and others. The operationalization of this specific approach to peace also differs depending on the unit of analysis (much like the operationalization of peace as a relationship). If the unit of analysis is an individual person, one might pose interview questions that sets out to target the specific individual’s idea of peace. If one, on the other hand, sets out to explore and analyze the ideas of peace that are prevalent, or even guiding, a state as such it might be advisable to in addition to interviews with individuals in the state apparatus also analyze policy documents issued by government, etc. (Jarstad et al. 2019).

Four methods for analyzing varieties of peace

Identifying different varieties of peace is fundamentally a question of classification (variations in kind), but the possibility of ranking (differences in degree) is also interesting. In this section

of the paper we will briefly describe four methods for developing analytical tools that allows the researcher to empirically capture varieties of peace, from (1) defining ideal types, via (2) compiling indexes and scales and (3) constructing typologies to (4) our own proposed method, where we try to combine differences in kind and differences in degree and argue for coherent sets of types of peace to which cases can belong in varying degrees.

Ideal types

Ideal types are probably the most common strategy for concept building in the social sciences. However, as noted by Goertz (2006, 83), “[i]t is striking to notice how often ideal types are used and the almost complete absence of any discussion of them in methodology texts.”

Ideal types are not empirical descriptions, but constitute abstractions from reality; “conceptual models of the essential characteristics of social phenomena” (Babbie 2016, 346). An ideal type represents the end point of a dimension or continuum and often has “zero extension”, meaning that there are no, or very few, empirical examples of it. Indeed, this is a core feature of ideal typical concept construction; if many empirical examples meet the definition of an ideal type, that ideal type probably represents a range rather than an end point of a dimension, and ought to be redefined.

Referring to Dahl’s distinction between the probably unattainable ideal of “democracy” and the closest empirical approximation of “polyarchy”, Goertz (2006, 85) concludes that: “Here we see the most typical features of an ideal type. The extension of the concept may well be zero or near zero. The usefulness of the ideal type is as a standard against which one can compare existing objects.”

As noted in the introduction, the most common way of describing different types of peace is with stand-alone concepts. Often, these are probably not intended as state of the art ideal types, but they nevertheless come closer to ideal types than to any alternative concept-building strategy, and they share the strengths and weaknesses of ideal types. An example is Gibler’s (2012) “territorial peace” which refers to situations where there is no outstanding territorial conflicts/disputes/claims, where neighboring states have agreed on their mutual border. Admittedly, there are numerous empirical examples of territorial peace, but the concept is unrelated to peace in terms of democracy, human rights, or even the use of force for other reasons than disagreements over borders.

Indexes and scales

Let us now move to the ordering principles of indexes and scales. Both indexes and scales are composite measures and they are useful not least because many social science variables and concepts have no clear and ambiguous single indicator (Babbie 2016, 156). The principal difference between indexes on the one hand, and scales on the other hand, is that “whereas indexes count the number of indicators of the variable, scales take account of the differing intensities of those indicators.” (Babbie 2016, 158)

To illustrate the distinction between the logics of index-construction and scale-construction, Babbie (2016, 158) uses the concept of political activism. When constructing an

index of political activism, he lists six types of political actions that people may take, *actions that represent similar degrees of political activism*:

- writing a letter to a public official,
- signing a political petition,
- giving money to a political cause,
- giving money to a political candidate,
- writing a political letter to the editor,
- persuading someone to change his or her voting plans.

People are given one (1) point for each of the actions they have taken. The logic is that each of the actions are in principle both equally likely and equally good examples of political activism; and the same goes for any combination of two or more of the actions.

Conversely, when constructing a scale of political activism Babbie presents four types of political *actions that represent very different degrees of activism*.

- running for office,
- working on a political campaign,
- contributing money to a political campaign,
- voting.

Here, the logic is that someone who has taken one of the more demanding actions would most likely have taken all the easier ones as well. Anyone who has contributed money to a political campaign has most likely also voted, but may or may not have worked on a political campaign; anyone who has worked on a political campaign has most likely also voted and contributed money, but may or may not have run for office.

It is worth noting that it is common practice in index construction to weight indicators differently. With enough weighting an index for all practical purposes can become a scale. This does not contradict the argument that the underlying logics of indexes and scales differ. It only illustrates that the distinction needs not be dichotomous.

Turning to peace, we must ask whether our understanding of peace is such that it is best understood as the presence of at least m of n conditions (such as three of four conditions or four of six conditions), but where each of these conditions can be substituted by enough of the others, meaning that none of them needs to be present in all cases of peace? Or is peace better understood as having a core, i.e., a minimum requirement without which any case is disqualified irrespective of how well it fulfills other conditions (other conditions that could nevertheless be used to qualify cases of peace into varying degrees)?³

³ The construction of indexes have much in common with what Goertz (2006, 95-98) calls the family resemblance concept structure, where a case belongs to a certain class of cases if it meets m of n conditions. For example, let's call anyone who has taken at least four of the six actions mentioned above in relation to the index of political activism *a political activist*. Using the family resemblance concept structure, any combination of at least four actions would suffice, meaning that if we identify 10 or 100 political activists there need not be a single action that they have all taken (for example, 50 of them may never have written to the editor and the other 50 may never have given money to a political candidate). Key aspects of this logic include additivity, averages and substitutability. Scales, on the other hand, come closer to the necessary and sufficient conditions concept structure

For example, for a scale of peace the absence of violence could be deemed more essential than democracy, meaning that the presence of residual violence results in a low peace score even if democracy is very well developed. Conversely, for an (unweighted) index of peace a high degree of democracy could compensate for the presence of residual violence and generate a higher peace score for the same case.

At this stage it is relevant to revisit the work of Davenport et al. (2018). After a thorough review of the peace literature for purposes of mapping out different definitions of “peace” that are most prevalent in scholarly work, the authors conclude that although definitions range from being all-encompassing to very narrow, there appears to be a common “core element” to the concept. This core is the *absence of violence* (Davenport et al. 2018, 44-46). Davenport, Melander and Regan sign off on this core element, and we concur with this minimum threshold requirement as well.

As much as the authors of the Peace Continuum agree on this core element of peace, they at the same time agree that contemporary scholarly work on the subject lacks conceptual clarity. As a consequence thereof, each of the authors propose an alternative way, and alternative indicators, that serve to provide conceptual clarity, and subsequent operationalization of the concept. For purposes of relating their work to our thoughts it is worthwhile to, just in brief, highlight which method/methods that are to be found on the broader “smorgasbord” that these authors engage with.

To begin with Regan, he understands peace conceptually as “an equilibrium condition where the resort to violence is minimal, and where the highest quality of peace exists when the idea of armed violence approaches the unthinkable” (Davenport et al. 2018, 79-80). In order to operationalize quality peace, then, he spells out a number of indicators that he believe are the most relevant for capturing the concept and that allow for the measurement of the concept based on variation, i.e. lower to higher quality of peace. For purposes of relating Regan’s thoughts to ours, he is hence preoccupied with creating a *scale* of quality peace.

In a similar manner, Melander (Davenport et al. 2018, 113) adheres to a definition of quality peace that resonates with the core element of non-violence, yet more broadly defined as “the conduct of politics with respect for the physical person of one’s adversary, using consensual decision-making, on the basis of strong equality values”. Useful indicators to capture and operationalize the concept, according to Melander, are; the absence of war, high respect for physical integrity rights, democratic political institutions and widespread respect for women’s social rights (Melander 2018, 113-114). He too, understands that countries, depending on how they perform on these individual indicators, can move up and down a peace *scale*.

Davenport (2018), on his end, conceives of peace as a “situation where distinct actors exist in a situation of ‘mutuality’”, which is contrasted against the conception of conflict whereby, as he understands it, “distinct actors exist in a relationship of opposition” (Davenport et al. 2018, 146). Though Davenport’s (2018, 161) indicators – opposition, overt aggression,

(Goertz 2006). Here, one or more specific conditions must be fulfilled (alone or in combination with others) for a case to belong to the certain class of cases. Using the four actions mentioned in relation to the scale of political activism above, we could say that in order to be a political activist you must have worked on a political campaign (your own or someone else’s), merely voting or contributing money isn’t enough no matter how much money you contributed. Key aspects of this logic include necessity and sufficiency.

latent aggression, indifference, latent cooperation, overt cooperation, and mutuality – are far more qualitative in character compared to the indicators used by his colleagues Regan and Melander, he too is engaged in the development of a peace *scale* upon which individual states can be located, and upon which they can move up and down.

Typologies

Two important approaches to classification are typologies and taxonomies, the main distinction being that typologies begin with concepts, i.e. theoretical constructs, and taxonomies begin with empirics (recall the discussion about deductive and inductive approaches to concept construction above). But once a conceptually based typology is filled with empirical cases and an empirically based taxonomy is given conceptual labels, they are very similar and they can thus be used in similar ways. Our approach in this paper is more theoretical and we therefore talk about typologies.

Typology means the study of types, and is a well-known strategy for concept construction in the social sciences. A typology is constructed on the basis of two (or more) variables, often dichotomous, or at least dichotomized. The variables can belong to any level of measurement from nominal to ratio (though interval and ratio scale variables would need to be divided into ranges). A typology based on two dichotomous variables is often illustrated as a two-by-two matrix.⁴

For example, the four components of a SWOT analysis are based on the two nominal variables internal/external factors and favorable/unfavorable factors, combined into the four types of factors that has given this kind of analysis its name.

Figure 1: SWOT analysis as example of a typology

	Favorable factors	Unfavorable factors
Internal factors	Strengths	Weaknesses
External factors	Opportunities	Threats

An example of a typology of peace is Sahovic's (2018) construction of four types of peace based on the two variables of ownership (power and legitimacy) and inter-group cooperation (collective solutions or each group on its own). Sahovic's approach is based on the theory of socio-cultural viability, often referred to as grid-group cultural theory, and when applied to peace and peacebuilding, he identifies:

- Forced peace and peacebuilding through authoritarian rule or protectorate/occupation,
- Controlled peace and peacebuilding through security and stability,
- Negotiated peace and peacebuilding through democracy and development, and
- Just peace and peacebuilding through reconciliation

⁴ Note that the two-by-two matrix is used for other things as well, such as illustrating correlations. This should not be confused with the use of typologies as a method for concept construction.

Figure 2: A typology of peace (adapted from Sahovic 2018)

	Each group for itself	Collective solutions
External ownership	Forced peace	Controlled peace
Internal ownership	Negotiated peace	Just peace

The three methods for concept construction discussed so far can be brought together in a typology on the basis of two dimensions: (1) whether the concepts vary by type (either-or-concepts) or by degree (more-or-less concepts), and (2) whether the concepts are stand-alone concepts or belong to coherent sets of concepts. As illustrated in Figure 3, the three methods discussed so far belong to three different types of concepts.

Figure 3: A typology of methods for conceptualizing/approaches to analyzing peace.

	Stand-alone concepts	Coherent sets of concepts
Either-or concepts	1: Ideal types, “peace with adjectives”	2: Sahovic’s typology, Höglund & Söderberg Kovac
More-or-less concepts	3: Global Peace Index, the Peace Continuum	4: Johansson & Saati (present paper)

The fourth method of concept construction (our proposition)

We now turn to the fourth type in the typology, which describes the type of analytical tool that we suggest would be the most useful one for studying different varieties of peace. This type/method combines the two more advanced forms of the dimensions that make up the typology in Figure 3.

As noted in the introduction, the logic described here – one or more coherent sets of types of peace – can be compared with the different types of conflict used by the UCDP. It is not a perfect match, but it serves to illustrate the point. We believe that different types of conflict as well as different types of peace are more useful as parts of coherent sets of types than as a stand-alone concepts. The framework sketched in this paper is part of our argument for strengthening this kind of conceptualization for peace.

We want to illustrate our argument by discussing how to analyze peace as situation. Jarstad et al (2019) suggest two dimensions as critical to understanding peace as situation: security and political order. These dimensions can be used as the common foundation for one or more coherent sets of types of peace, either separately or combined. Note that the purpose of the illustration is to show how this kind of analytical tool could be constructed, not to make a case for the use of the particular dimensions or indicators we refer to.

Used separately, we can first formulate varieties of peace that differ in terms of security. We can then think of *insecure peace*, with “widespread violent crimes following the ending of the war” (Höglund and Söderberg Kovacs 2019, 381); or a *militarized peace* where security is

provided through highly visible security personnel, check points, etc; or a *civil peace* characterized by the rule of law and respect for human rights. Situations of peace can then be sorted into these three varieties according to which one they fit best. This corresponds to the upper right-hand square of the typology in Figure 3.

Next we add the possibility of grading how well different situations correspond to the variety of peace that they fit best. This is done by constructing an index or a scale (or a single-variable dimension) for each of the three security-based varieties of peace. Two situations that are both cases of, say, *insecure peace* (i.e. they fit the definition of *insecure peace* better than they fit either *militarized peace* or *civil peace*) could still vary in degree regarding how well they correspond to the definition of *insecure peace*. An index of insecure peace could contain variables such as homicide rates, human rights abuses and the like. Constructing an index or a scale for an individual variety of peace corresponds to the lower left-hand square of the typology in Figure 3.

So, to restate the argument, compared to a traditional typology (square 2 in Figure 3) our proposed method adds the possibility to rank cases according to how well they correspond to a particular variety of peace; and compared to a traditional index or scale (square 3 in Figure 3) it adds the possibility to analyze differences in kind, and to relate those kinds to each other in a coherent way.

In the same way, we could formulate varieties of peace on the basis of political order. These could be *authoritarian peace*, where we would sort situations characterized by authoritarian rule; *sectarian peace* for situations of power-sharing constitutional arrangements; and *democratic peace* for situations of peace characterized by a democratic system of government. Or the two dimensions of security and political order could be brought together to form a typology containing varieties of peace based on combinations of these dimensions. Indexes or scales could be constructed for these varieties as well. (And, of course, all of the above could be done separately for peace as relation and peace as idea.)

Constructing coherent sets of varieties of peace and measuring the degree to which situations correspond to the definition of particular varieties resembles the logic of fuzzy sets and the idea that cases can display partial membership in sets (i.e., they need not be either fully in or fully out, e.g. either fully democratic or fully non-democratic). This way we do not have to choose between either distinguishing between types of peace (and being unable to talk about more or less) or distinguishing between more or less peace (and being unable to talk about different types). Further it allows us to acknowledge that claims about a certain variety of peace should apply with full force to cases that are “full members” of that particular variety, but may apply to a lesser extent to cases that are “weak members” of that same set (see e.g. Ragin 2003, 181–182).

Discussing advantages and drawbacks

We have reached the concluding section of this paper, and it is hence time to reflect on the advantages and drawbacks of the respective methods for developing analytical tools that capture varieties of peace.

Beginning with ideal types; though they are (usually) quite “catchy” in the sense that they undeniably evoke interest, give some form of initial signal of what “type of peace” that is being referred to (one can almost instinctively appreciate what a “cruel peace”, “unjust peace” or a “unresolved peace” for example imply) and enable us to measure real cases against a theoretical ideal – which ideal types de facto are – they also have some disadvantages that ought to be mentioned. As brought to attention earlier, ideal types – at least the ones that we have come across in the peace literature – are nevertheless, stand-alone concepts that do not relate to each other. This means that when we make use of such ideal types, empirical cases are not being evaluated as this, that or the other type of peace based on the same set of criteria. In turn, this implies that we can only know that “cruel peace” is different from “unresolved peace”, but we do not know how these types relate to each other. This is one drawback. Since these ideal types do not relate to each other, it also occurs (quite often unfortunately), that i) peace researchers use different types of peace with each other (recall Richmond (2006) who uses the concepts of “constitutional”, “institutional” and “democratic” peace interchangeably), and that ii) peace researchers refer to different types of peace, but use the same adjective when doing so (e.g. “unresolved peace” being used to describe cases that are in fact very different from each other).

Moving on to discussing indexes and scales, we believe that one of the main strengths of this method is that such measurements make it possible to compare two or more cases with each other at a given point in time; with each other over a period of time; and a single case can also be compared to its own “peace status” over a period of time. Hence, as opposed to the ideal types just discussed, when we construct or use an index or a scale of peace (or peacefulness) all empirical cases are being measured on the same indicators which makes it possible to relate the cases to each other. A drawback of constructing, and subsequently using indexes, is that the indicators used are presumed to have the same significance (recall the example of political activism above), when they may in fact not have the same significance – which of course causes validity issues.

Scale construction, in turn, likely gives a more nuanced picture of how “peaceful” a given country is, at a specific time and over a time period as well, since it does not simply add all indicators on top of each other and grant them equal weight but rather takes into account the intensity of these indicators as well. The drawback is that scale construction is probably more demanding than indexes in terms of finding suitable indicators. Furthermore, issues that pertain to how indicators are weighed against each other will always be a cause for debate.

Typologies in turn, create coherent sets of types – as we have called for in this paper – meaning that empirical cases of peace can be distinguished into different types of peace (types that are not stand alone concepts). This is an advantage of typology construction for the purposes of developing analytical tools that capture varieties of peace; another is that such typologies can be exhaustive (if they are well constructed), and that they allow cases to be related to each other in a systematic way. The point of being exhaustive can however also turn into a disadvantage of the method. The empirical examples above (recall the components of the SWOT analysis and Sahovic’s typology) are based on two dichotomous variables on the x and y axis respectively, giving the typologies four cells in total. However the number of dimensions in a typology can be greater, and the dimensions do not need to be dichotomous. However, the number of cells in the typology increases for each additional dimension and for

each value that the dimensions can take. Already at three dimensions with three values each we have a typology with twenty-seven different types - many of which are likely to lack empirical cases (to have “zero extension”). Another objection that may be raised against typologies is that we will rely too heavily on dichotomized variables (or at least variables with a few limited ranges, such as “low”, “medium” and “high”) when we should instead focus on continuous variables that can give us a more and nuanced description of the type of peace that we are trying to capture.

Finally, the advantages and drawbacks of our proposed method: In comparison to the other methods, accounted for above, that one may opt for when developing analytical tool for varieties of peace, our proposal for how to approach this endeavor is probably the most advanced, and will hence also allow for the most advanced analysis of empirical cases. It is our belief that one of the strengths of a theoretically coherent set of types based on a common foundation would be that it both i) distinguishes between different types of peace, and ii) distinguishes between cases of peace and cases of non-peace as we have illustrated above. We also believe that it is an advantage to combine differences in kind and differences in degree into the same method of conceptualization and into the same analytical framework. We do however acknowledge that despite, or perhaps rather because of, our proposed method is quite advanced it is also the most challenging method for developing analytical tools for varieties of peace, both in terms of operationalization's and in terms of data collection.

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